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Some of the most important recent work on African labor history 
has been concerned with the mining industry in Southern Africa. The 
case of the South African gold mining industry has been at the center 
of this work. A distinctive feature of this industry was the high de-
gree of control which mining capital developed over its black labor 
force, and the high degree of exploitation of black labor that went 
with this. This control was achieved through a variety of economic 
and extra-economic mechanisms, particularly recruiting agents, the 
compound system, and servile labor laws. These measures enabled South 
African mining capital to monopsonize black labor, ensuring adequate 
labor supplies for minimal cost. 1 
Because mining capital did develop such control in this case, 
the analysis of the relations between mining capital and black labor 
in Southern Africa has tended to focus on capital's role in achieving 
its ends, rather than on the role of black labor. This is understandable 
in view of the highly coercive nature of the South African system and 
its limitations on black labor action. However, the Southern African 
case is deceptive. Mining capital in Central Africa did not always 
have this same degree of control over its labor force - a different 
historical pattern with important implications for both corporate labor 
strategy and black labor action. 
This paper will examine black and corporate labor strategies on 
the Rhodesian Copperbelt, based on evidence from four specific mines: 
Rhokana (Nkana) and Nchanga Copper Mines owned by Anglo-American Cor-
poration of South Africa (AA), and Roan Antelope and Mufulira Copper 
Mines owned by Rhodesian Selec.tion Trust of London (RST) . This paper 
argues that from the beginning of the copper mines in 1926 until the 
depression, mining capital on the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt did 
2 
not achieve the same degree of control over its black labor force as 
existed in the South African gold mining industry; and that the crucial 
aspect of this lack of control was not the absence of servile labor 
measures, which did in fact exist in Northern Rhodesia, but rather the 
inability of mining capital to eliminate competition for labor and 
the competitive market determination of wages and other returns to labor. 
This meant that on the Copperbelt, black workers had some degree of 
effective market power in relation to mining capital, and that this 
greater role of market factors on the Copperbelt was indeed reflected 
in the consciousness and behavior of the black workers and in corporate 
2 labor strategy. 
Black workers on the Copperbelt understood their bargaining power 
in the labor market and they used it. They actively sought out the 
best employment, changing employers frequently in response to better 
rewards. This affected corporate labor strategy, which, unlike that 
on the Rand, had to be more responsive to black worker consciousness 
and behavior in order to secure and retain adequate labor for production. 
Only when the depression turned labor shortage into over-supply, did 
the pendulum of market power swing over to mining capital. This study 
suggests that while Southern African labor history has, with good reason, 
focused much attention on the determining role of corporate labor 
strategy and of the colonial regimentation of labor, Copperbelt labor 
history reveals important roles both for black labor strategy and for 
market factors in the relations between capital and black labor in colonial 
Africa. 
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Labor Supply before the Depression 
The general labor shortage of the 1920s in Central Africa put 
workers, particularly skilled workers, in a good bargaining position 
in the labor market. 3 Jobs were plentiful, while experienced workers 
were in short supply. Widespread and accurate information networks 
about wages, work, and living conditions at mines inside and outside 
Northern Rhodesia enabled miners to compare the potential rewards for 
their labor. Northern Rhodesian workers learned they could change 
jobs easily, and they did. They avoided organized recruitment in order 
to choose employers themselves. Many workers preferred to work for 
contractors because of "the loose system of control they exercised 
over labour at work and in the compounds." 4 Mines with poor reputations, 
5 
such as Nkana, had difficulty obtaining voluntary laborers. Even re-
cruited labor could, and did, choose between working in or outside 
Northern Rhodesia. 
When Rhodesian Selection Trust (RST) of London and Anglo-American 
(M) of South Africa began construction on the four major copper mines 
in 1926, Northern Rhodesians did not automatically flock to the new 
mines. They compared Copperbelt wages, working and ltving conditions 
with those of other employers. Many chose to work elsewhere. In 1929, 
about 50,000 Northern Rhodesians were still working outside the country, 
of whom about 30,000 were in Southern Rhodesia. Some went simply because 
of proximity, but many more were drawn by the higher wages as well. 
Better working and living conditions also attracted Northern Rhodesians 
to the Union Mini~re copper mine in Katanga. Some 10,500 Northern 
.... 
Rhodesians worked there in 1929. Union Miniere's shift to a stabilized 
labor policy in 1927 was accompanied by a dramatic upgrading of living 
conditions for their workers. "By the end of the decade Africans in 
Elizabethville enjoyed the best food and housing of any black in the 
4 
whole of central Africa," 6 These advantages were well known, and Union 
Miniere recruiters had no difficulty obtaining Northern Rhodesian 
labor. In fact, many Northern.Rhodesians went to Katanga on their own 
7 
rather than work on the Copperbelt. Within Northern Rhodesia, Broken 
Hill and Bwana Mkubwa mines competed with the Copperbelt companies for 
labor. Miners liked these mines because they allowed workers to bring 
dependents to the mines, providing housing and rations for them. Broken 
Hill was especially popular because it gave married, long-service miners 
five-acre plots to supplement their rations and wages. 8 
Corporate Responses to the Labor Shortage 
Northern Rhodesian companies responded to this situation in a 
number of ways. One avenue they pursued was to stem the outflow of 
labor to neighboring colonies. Since voluntary labor both remained 
at the mines longer and cost less (due to the absence of a recruiting 
fee), management preferred to utilize this kind of labor as much as 
possible. In this period, about two-thirds of the companies' labor 
force came to the mines on their own. The companies hoped that limi-
tations on foreign recruitment would narrow the economic opportunities 
of Northern Rhodesian labor to the point where they could obtain a 
wholly volunteer labor force. To that end, they pressed the Northern 
Rhodesian government to help them secure more control over the labor 
supply, demanding immediate limitations on foreign recruitment. The 
government was willing to cooperate; but negotiations were lengthy 
and delicate. From 1925 on, the government reduced Katanga's allotment 
of recruits. However, recruitment continued until July 31, 1931. The 
flow southward into Southern Rhodesia did not diminish until the de-
pression, and then due to market factors rather than legislation. 
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Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland did not coordinate 
their labor policies until 1936, when an agreement establi~hed the pri-
ority of each country's labor needs. 9 Thus, during the 1920s the Northern 
Rhodesian government was not able to provide the copper mines with a 
monopoly over Northern Rhodesian labor. 
The shortage of voluntary labor forced the mines to turn to re-
cruiting agents. Initially, each mine hired private recruiting agents 
to go into the rural areas to obtain workers for six- to nine-month 
contracts. These agents guaranteed their recruits passage to and from 
the mines as well as wages, rations, housing, and medical care during 
employment. Yet these individual recruiters were unable to supply 
enough recruits, and as a result, their activities merely led to compe-
titive wage increases without solving the labor shortage. In 1929, 
the mines attempted to solve this dilemma by establi.shing a joint re-
cruiting agency, the Native Labor Association. This Association satisfied 
the mining companies' needs for extra unskilled labor. More important, 
it recruited some of the more skilled labor necessary for production. 
In the early 1930s, some 2400 trained Southern Rhodesian miners were 
recruited to upgrade the work force, and over 2000 Nyasaland workers 
were brought in to fill much needed clerical jobs. 10 
Rhodesian Anglo-American even petitioned the Colonial Office to 
permit permanent settlement for several thousand.skilled laborers from 
Nyasaland at Rhokana, offering them good housing, recreation, medical, 
and welfare facilities, as well as social security benefits. The mines 
were willing to bear the cost of this proposal if it would keep production 
moving. 11 
The mining companies also tried to limit labor needs through mech-
anization wherever possible. Both mines complained about the quality 
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of their laborers. L. Eaton of RST found "the native negro ... small 
and unused to hard physical labor." Mechanization seemed the logical 
answer. Management believed labor could "be taught to handle simple 
mechanical equipment or routine work. The supply [of labor] is inadequate 
and recourse must therefore be had to minimizing methods in which the 
ore is moved by mechanical or gravity means. 1112 Elaborate plans were 
drawn up to increase mechanization in the future. 
However, none of these particular responses succeeded in overcoming 
competition between the mines for voluntary labor. Because of their 
need to attract voluntary labor, and their failure to monopsonize re-
cruitment in the manner of the Rand mines, the mining companies had to 
offer conditions of employment comparable, or nearly comparable, to 
those at neighboring mines. This competition led to a situation where 
the mines "were all looking for recruits and making offers better than 
the man next door to get the native to engage. 1113 
Wages on the Copperbelt rose accordingly. Each mine tried to outbid 
the other for labor. At Mufulira, for example, the general manager 
wrote the head office in 1929 saying that "Mufulira's pay was a little 
lower and should be put up with other Copperbelt wages." By that year, 
the average monthly wage of black workers on the Copperbelt was 18s, 
while many experienced men earned between 20s and 22/6d. A few under-
ground workers even started as high as 30s. Skilled underground workers 
were in great demand, some drawing wages of 45s or more per month. 
By 1930, the average wages at Roan were 21s per month for surface work 
and 33s for underground work. These wages enabled the Copperbelt mines 
to compete with Union Mini~re for skilled labor, and to outbid them 
for unskilled labor. Northern Rhodesian wages were still below those 
of the sisal estates of Tanganyika and the Wankie mines in Southern 
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Rhodesia, which had average monthly wages of 22/6 and 32/6 respectively, 14 
However, since Katanga was the nearest competitor for Copperbelt labor, 
the mines concentrated on competing with Union Mini~re. 
Competition for labor forced the mines to alter the traditional 
South African migrant labor system, since Northern Rhodesian workers -
particularly more skilled and experienced workers - were accustomed 
to having their families with them during employment in Katanga and 
at other local mines. Since white labor was both scarce and expensive, 
it was still profitable to supply accommodations and rations to attract 
experienced African workers, The acceptance of married labor varied 
with the differing labor needs and managerial traditions of the two 
Copperbelt companies. Because of the nature of its orebody, the RST 
mine, Roan Antelope, required a higher percentage of experienced labor, 
As a result, the compound manager reported that "in the early days it 
was practically impossible to get labor and so when a native offered 
himself for work, we were only too pleased to take them together with 
their wives and families." 15 When production started in 1930, the 
need for experienced labor increased. The percentage of married labor 
rose accordingly, moving from 20 percent of the work force in 1927 
to 47.3 percent in 1932. The average length of servwe for surface workers 
climbed to eighteen months, with 64 percent of the African employees in 
1932 having over a year's employment on the mine. 16 
In contrast, Anglo-American mines made more strenuous efforts to 
maintain a migrant labor force. Except for settling a small number 
of skilled miners, management saw no reason to spend money on accom-
modations•for married workers. Anglo-American decided to rely on re-
cruitment and mechanization instead. Since the orebodies at Rhokana and 
Nchanga mines required less trained labor, these mines were able to 
maintain a lower standard for recruits. Anglo-American management 
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was accustomed to the South 'African migrant labor system. Rhokana 
field management was appointed and closely supervised by South African 
consulting engineers from the Johannesburg office. These men preferred 
17 the migrant labor system. However, economics, not ideology, was 
the issue. Anglo was willing to stabilize where necessary, but as long 
as sufficient voluntary unskilled migrant labor could be found, the mi-
grant labor system was cheaper for those workers. Consequently, Anglo-
American's married labor force remained considerably lower than RST's. 
These competitive labor strategies also affected compound condi-
tions on the Copperbelt. As H. H. Field remarked in 1930, "it almost 
appeared now that competitive recruiting has been done away with, the 
mines were going in for a competitive Compound program." 18 Roan was 
intent on keeping up with Union Mini~re's programs. Between 1926 and 
1927, expenditure per worker increased by 40 percent, primarily for 
housing, food and social services. In 1932, Union Mini~re's service 
cost for each African employee reached a record 22.Sd/ticket, while 
Roan spent 16. Sd/ticket and Nkana spent 11. 64d:' Roan and Mufulira 
consulted frequently with government about improving conditions. They 
brought in teams of experts to help improve health standards. In con-
trast, Anglo-American mines hired fewer experts, and were less willing to 
provide more than the bare essentials for their workers. 19 
Although housing on all the mines was cramped and inadequate, Roan 
and Mufulira tried harder to create a village atmosphere to attract and 
keep labor. Most mine houses were round, one-room structures, built of 
Kimberly brick with dirt floors, a thatched or iron roof, and often 
- - - --·-··--··· 
lacking even\one window. Some compounds had barracks, with long rows 
9 
of contiguous rooms, back to back. Only the simplest furniture was 
provided. There was no water or electricity. Frequent overcrowding 
occurred with seven or eight men sleeping in a house designed for four. 
Roan and Mufulira tried to provide similar living conditions on both 
mines, but housing conditions varied somewhat. In 1930, Mufulira had 
the best housing on the Copperbelt. Housing at Roan was not as good, 
but employees were allowed to build little fences around their houses, 
to make hen coops, and to keep fowl and small animals. Married workers 
liked this because it helped supplement the meager rations for worn 
A 
and children. 20 In contrast, Nkana compound, which housed some 6,000 
laborers in 1931, was very stark, and "utterly unAfrican in its pre-
cision and mathematical regularity." The single men were housed in bar-
rack-like buildings. There .were no trees, and the general atmosphere 
was barren and hostile. Nchanga was similarly stark, although a housing 
program begun in 1931 did improve conditions somewhat by building some 
brick houses with kitchen huts·in front. Most houses still had only 
f . h f · 1 b f · 1 21 one room or eit er a ami y or a num er o singe men. 
Health care and accident prevention received serious attention at 
the mines and in this period. Once again, the RST mines had the best 
record because of their need to compete for experienced labor. In 1931, 
only 17 out of 1000 Roan employees died from illness, while Nkana's 
death· rate was 39 per 1000. Neither of these figures compare favorably 
with Union Mini~re's rate of 8.01 per 1000, nor the Rand's rate of 12 
per 1000, but the RST mines were clearly trying. 22 Both companies 
worked hard to minimize accident rates. Again, Roan had the best safety 
procedures. All African gang supervisors (boss boys) were trained in 
first aid work. Candidates for blasting certificates at Nkana received 
similar training. The death rate below ground on all the Northern 
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Rhodesian mines was 4.3 per 1000 in 1929 and 3.6 per 1000 in 1930, a 
little higher than those in South Africa and Katanga. Inl930, the fatal 
accident rates in Northern Rhodesia fell below those in Southern Rhodesia 
and South Africa. 23 In this period of labor scarcity, the mining com-
panies realized high accident rates would drive labor away. 
The greatest differences in compound expenditures occured in the 
recreation and welfare facilities. In order to attract skilled labor, 
both Roan and Mufulira provided facilities equivalent to or nearly com-
parable to those available at Union Miniere, Broken Hill, and Bwana 
Mkubwa. This was especially true after production began. Union Miniere's 
elaborate social service facilities set the standard for competition 
until Katanga recruiting stopped in 1931. After that, RST still competed 
with neighboring employers. 
Roan's welfare facilities aimed to attract and keep adequate num-
bers of more skilled educated workers at the mine. Many of these men 
were interested in "bettering themselves," and were attracted by facilities 
for reading, debating, and similar activities. Consequently, Roan at-
tempted to fulfill these needs as well as to supply the more standard 
amusements such as sports and cinemas. A full-time welfare officer 
was hired in 1929, and in 1930 a large recreation hall was completed. 
"In the main hall provision has been made for letter writing, there are 
tables and benches placed conveniently, and racks for native newspapers 
are provided. It is also possible to obtain soft drinks, biscuits, 
writing paper and envelopes, pencils, tobacco and cigarattes. Hot tea 
is always available ••.. Another item which is popular is a gramaphone 
with a quantity of records." The gramaphones often did not work, and 
the reading material disappeared, but the hall still provided a center 
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where more educated miners could come to relax and learn. The welfare 
officer organized activities for the rest of the work force as well. 
Football fields and sports grounds were built. Physical training classes, 
football, pushball and other games were popular. Twice-weekly movies 
frequently had audiences of over 2000 people. The movies were care-
fully screened to keep "the native from losing his respect for Eutll!:pean 
women." Concerts,. gramaphone recitals, debates, and indoor games were 
held in the evenings for more educated audiences. Night school classes 
were offered in English, first aid, and other subjects of interest to 
those aiming for self-improvement. While the mines offered few programs 
for women, there were some activities for children. A small school 
tried to educate an often fluctuating pupil population. A playground 
with swings and other equipment was fenced in during 1930. 24 These 
activities increased Roan's attractiveness to married workers with 
children by offering advantages not available in the rural areas. Since 
married workers were generally more skilled, welfare policies designed 
for their needs encouraged these workers to remain at the mines for 
longer periods of time, therefore supporting Roan's policy of encouraging 
longer-service, married labor. 
Mufulira closed in 1931, but before the closure welfare facilities 
for families were being developed. Management hired a woman welfare 
officer; and work was started among the women and children. They stressed 
the need 11to save the children from ignorance, 11 and "to give women in-
terests which would usefully occupy their time. 1125 
The higher turnover of labor at Nkana and Nchanga called for dif-
ferent welfare policies. A migrant labor force could not utilize pro-
grams demanding extended participation. Education, Pathfinder Scouts, 
debating clubs, and other activities were less appealing to short-term 
employees. Management wanted welfare activities to control and amuse 
workers during their leisure hours, not to keep them at the mines. 
Consequently, welfare programs concentrated on sports and cinemas. 
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A welfare officer, Mr. Nutter, ran a small children's school. He taught 
carpentry and other skills which could supplement wages. The men prac-
ticed repairing mine furniture and other mine equipment, thus saving 
money for the company. He also went around the compound checking con-
ditions and teaching hygiene. This was unpopular, as Nutter had a well-
deserved reputation for taking advantage of miners' wives while their 
husbands worked. Despite objections, the mines kept Nutter on as 
welfare officer. Clearly his low salary and money-saving activities 
were more important than his effectiveness as a welfare officer. 
Nchanga had even fewer facilities before it closed down in 1931. 26 
Northern Rhodesian labor gradually responded to these labor stra-
tegies, and by 1930, many Northern Rhodesians chose to work on the 
27 Copperbelt rather than elsewhere. Within the Copperbelt, the,se workers 
with the greatest leverage in the wage labor marke~, namely experienced 
miners, gravitated to the RST mines because of the conditions described 
above. Inexperienced unskilled labor went to the less popular Anglo-
American mines. As these workers gained experience, they frequently 
moved over to the more popular mines. This behavior reveals black labor's 
growing awareness of and ability to manipulate the wage labor market, 
and demonstrates the need (as long as market forces on the Copperbelt 
favored black labor) for a corporate labor strategy which would ac~ 
commodate this reality. 
Corporate Labor Strategy in the Depression 
When the world depression hit the Northern Rhodesian copper industry 
in 1931, the mines shifted suddenly from a shortage to an overabundance 
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of laborers. With the closing of Katanga to Northern Rhodesian laborers, 
the mines short-circuited their biggest competitor. With the fall in 
copper prices (from h74 a ton in early 1931 to b24 a ton at the end 
of 1931), 28 production on the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt almost 
ground to a halt. Only Rhokana and Roan Antelope maintained a limited 
output of copper. European employees were reduced from 3,326 to 964 
in 1932. Mufulira and Nchanga became virtual ghost towns. The African 
labor force declined from 30,000 miners in early 1931 to 11,636 by 
January 1932. By December 1932, this number dwindled to a mere 6,677. 
Large numbers of unemployed workers drifted around the Copperbelt in 
search of work. In 1935, the government reported a "floating population 
of at least 5000 natives moving between Ndola and the mines looking for 
work." 29 
Suddenly African laborers lost their leverage in the wage labor 
market, a leverage which was now gained by the mining companies. As 
employment opportunities dried up all over Southern Africa, miners 
clung fiercely to their jobs. Absenteeism and desertion fell to new 
lows. Roan listed only five absentees daily in 1932. Even the unpopular 
Anglo-American mines had no trouble keeping workers. 30 At Nkana mine 
alone, over 20,000 men applied for work in 1935; only 6,723 were ac~ 
cepted. At Roan in 1936, some 500 men applied for only 150 jobs. 31 
Even skilled and semi-skilled men were easier to hire, for these men 
were more accustomed to urban life. Consequently, many of them remained 
near the Copperbelt after losing their jobs, hoping to be rehired so 
they could continue to live in town. This excess of potential laborers 
allowed the mines to raise their standards for recruits. Physical con-
ditions, education, and skill levels for new employees were all in-
creased. Each mine kept a labor pool of hand-picked men in the compounds. 
These workers were fed and housed in the compounds, and provided a 
32 
ready back-up system for labor needs. 
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Corporate strategy designed to attract laborers away from nearby 
competitors were no longer necessary. Recruits poured into the mines 
voluntarily. The Native Labour Association was disbanded as formal 
recruitment became an unnecessary expense. Despite higher wages to the 
south, the excess labor supply allowed Northern Rhodesians to work out-
side the country without threatening the labor supplies of the copper 
mines. 33 The new market conditions meant that the copper mining companies 
could now lower their wage and living standards without jeopardizing 
their labor supply. In a world where copper prices were falling rapidly, 
low-cost labor was an important factor determining profitability. 
Already low-cost producers on the world market, the Northern Rhodesian 
mines had to lower their costs even more in order to survive the current 
world crisis. They soon set about adjusting their labor policies ac-
cordingly. 
Although no formal ties existed between RST and AA, the two com-
panies quickly took advantage of their new position in the labor market. 
The lessons of earlier competition had been well learned. The two 
companies maintained close contacts, both at the highest levels of 
management, and on the Copperbelt. Led by Rhokana in 1932, the mines 
made across-the-board cuts in African wages. In 1933, surface wages 
for new employees were lowered from 17s/6d per 30 working days to 
12s/6d per 30 working days, and underground wages were similarly reduced 
from 30s/0d to 22s/6d (at Nkana it was 20/6) per 30 working days. 
Increments for experience remained the same, but the maximum levels were 
34 
reduced. The mines reassured themselves that they were only providing 
a fair wage in a former·ly unrealistic and inflated labor market. The 
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wage cuts were declared "reasonable" and became the foundation of a 
new labor policy. 
Housing conditions deteriorated now that adequate supplies of labor 
were readily available. In 1932, only 220 out of a total of 2,325 
houses had more than one room. This housing was for a married labor 
force of 37.33 percent. Unmarried quarters were always overcrowded, 
frequently housing 4-6 men in one small house. Nkana's conditions were 
even worse. A visiting district commissioner described the married 
quarter as "little more than sltlIIls. 1135 Even Mr. Geddes, a director of 
Anglo-American, admitted that "the siting of the married quarters quite 
defeated him. 1136 At Kitwe Compound, barrack-type houses were built, 
with two rooms to each family, the back of one house facing the front 
of the other. Overcrowding and lack of privacy were endemic. The 
new Mindolo compound had separate houses in better condition, but the 
compound was small, and did not relieve the general congestion. Visitors 
to the Rhokana compounds were struck by "the more rigid and mechanical 
atmosphere and less of the personal touch than exists at Roan. 1137 
The Commission of Enquiry in 1935, after their tour of the compounds, 
declared that their "general impression ... was a lack of shade in 
the compound and that the huts might be described as austere quarters 
rather than houses. 1138 
Little effort was made to improve the welfare programs at the mines. 
The labor supply was no longer affected by such variations. Mr. Nutter 
continued running his little school, teaching carpentry and generally 
seeing "to the repairs in the compounds. 1139 Both mines maintained 
small welfare halls, but attendance was low. Roan reported a daily 
attendance at their welfare hall of less than 10 in 1932. Only the 
dry canteen was well used. 40 The compound managers had no incentive 
to increase the popularity of their recreation programs, and dismissed 
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the need for change. They concluded that "you are up against the native 
apathy towards anything that is done for his recreation .... They 
[the Africans] have the idea that whatever is required of them, •. 
it is solely for the amusement of the Bwanas." 41 Now that labor sup-
plies were abundant, the companies saw no reason to improve their pro-
grams. 
Mining accidents increased in this period, despite government 
inspections of the mines. With the labor glut, the mines no longer 
feared loss of labor due to accidents, despite widespread African know-
ledge of mining conditions. The fatal accident rate rose from 1.33 
per 1000 in 1932 to 3.93 per 1000 in 1933, but dropped again to 1.84 
per 1000 in 1935, due to some efforts at reform after a strike in 1935. 
Serious personal injuries also rose, reaching a peak of 13.67 per 1000 
in 1933. The majority of accidents were underground and some increases 
can be explained by initial production problems. However, safeguards 
were clearly inadequate. Nkana was the worst offender. Even one of 
Rhokana's directors, Mr. Geddes, had to admit in 1933 that Nkana was 
shamefully behind Roan, and that of the 15 deaths in the last 5 months 
of 1933, 10 of them "should and could" have been prevented by the 
42 European staff. Despite such chastisements, no serious efforts were 
made at reform. 
Sickness rates improved at both mines, although once again Roan 
had the best conditions. This was the one area of labor policy that 
did not suffer during the depression. However, sickness and deaths 
from illness were still much worse for Africans than for European em-
-ployees. Children: suffered the most. Crowdi!l!iin the compounds encouraged 
epidemics which periodically swept through, leaving death and disruption 
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. h . k 43 in t eir wa e. Health care aimed primarily to keep workers productive 
rather than to maintain the health of dependents. Also, fear of disease 
spreading to the European community undoubtedly kept management alert 
to health needs. 
Compound discipline was tightened up now that miners no longer 
wanted to leave employment. Dismissal became a potent weapon much feared 
by the workers. Management could count upon large numbers of recruits 
eager to replace any dismissed workers. Consequently, dismissals were 
an effective threat keeping workers efficent and well-behaved, Workers 
were well aware of the difficulty of being rehired at other mines if 
they were dismissed for bad conduct. Scrivener, the compound manager 
at Rhokana, admitted in 1935 that if a labor shortage developed, the 
present policy of dismissals would not be sufficient to maintain disci-
pline, but as long as the labor surplus continued, it was an effective 
method. Spearpoint, the compound manager at Roan, reiterated this view 
point when he told the 1935 strike commission that "we find the threat 
of dismissal and the bonus system fulfills our needs." 44 
Conclusion 
The argument of this paper has been that the relationship between 
capital and labor on the Copperbelt was significantly affected by black 
worker consciousness and behavior and by market factors, more so than 
it was on the Rand. This was evident in different ways before and during 
the Depression, The failure of the mining companies to eliminate intra-
industry competition for labor and competitive wage determination meant 
that during a period of labor shortage, black workers were able to wield 
some market power, which forced corporate labor strategy to respond to 
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them. This illustrates the importance of the control achieved in 
the areas of recruitment and wage minimization by mining capital on the 
Rand. When the Depression created an oversupply of labor, mining capital 
took full advantage of its new economic power over black labor by lowering 
wages and abandoning recruitment. Consequently, when labor shortages 
returned to the Copperbelt after the Depression, the companies had to 
revert to their pre~Depression policy of encouraging married stabilized 
labor, which politicized black workers in important ways, so that black 
labor strategy came to play an even greater role in class relations on 
the Copperbelt. These political consequences of stabilization on the 
Copperbelt tended, in turn, to confirm the fears of Rand mining capital 
about the danger of precisely such policies, fears which·led it to 
maintain its migrant labor system. 
From the very beginning of mining on the Copperbelt, therefore, 
black worker consciousness and behavior came to play particularly sig-
nificant roles in the capital-labor relationship. This study reaffirms 
the need to give more attention to black labor strategies in the labor 
history and political economy of ·colonial Africa. 
19 
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